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 Abstract 
 
 
This project reviews the structure of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities at 
issuance as well as their underlying collateral analysis and deal level analysis. 
Through the comparison of CMBS 1.0 and CMBS 2.0 (CMBS 1.0 is the Commercial 
Mortgage Backed Securities issued pre-crisis and CMBS 2.0 is the CMBS that was 
issued after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), we investigate how the underwriting 
standards evolved as a response to the crisis of 2008.  
 
This paper looks at several different categories with convergent informational 
outcomes. This paper identifies how underwriting standards becomes stricter, for 
example the cutoff LTV for CMBS 2.0 is lower and cutoff DSCR for CMBS 2.0 is higher. 
The new CMBS issuance starts to take off after 2008, though slowly.  
 
Moreover, this paper provides estimates of expected loss by vintage through the 
use of its own collateral model. Bloomberg identifies the deals we modeled as falling 
into one of the following categories: Conduit, Portfolio, SASB (single asset/single 
borrower), or Small Balance deals. In total, we modeled 617 American CMBS deals, 
which originated at various years between 2000 and 2011. Approximately 4,000 
bonds were included in our model. The underlying property and loan information 
that we used in our model came exclusively from the Bloomberg database. We 
modeled the change in property values by the time-dependent Moody’s CPPI index. 
 We also considered stressed property values. The discount factor on the value of a 
particular stressed property is influenced by relative location of the target property 
to stressed properties. We subtracted the current balance of the underlying loan by 
the current estimated value of the property in our model to get the expected loss for 
each loan. Then we summed each of the individual losses to get the expected total 
loss for each deal. This algorithm influenced our decision to investigate the change in 
value of the collateral underwriting the loans. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) market became an 
important source of financing for commercial real estate beginning in the early 1990s. 
After the Subprime Crisis of 2008, rating agencies were blamed for underestimating 
the volatility of the subprime asset class when acceptable levels of risk associated 
with leverage.  Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, investors have become 
increasingly aware of the risk associated with structured financial products such as 
CMBS and residential mortgage-backed securities amongst other types of 
asset-backed securities. Investors have wanted to ensure that the volatility of their 
investment asset class, identified as the correlation between default loans and the 
expectation of loss associated with structured financial products, were well realized 
and adjusted by the rating agency and the industry. The issuance of CMBS after 2008 
decreased dramatically due to the decreased demand from frightened investors and 
to the increased stringency in the industry’s underwriting standards. From 2010 
onward, the appetite for securitized assets began to return and CMBS issuance once 
again began to rise. Compared to the earlier CMBS 1.0 deal, the deals of CMBS 2.0 
are generally more conservative in nature. This conservative propensity is 
exemplified in lower LTVs, higher DSCRs, lower concentrations, smaller sizes, and 
lower non-standard properties.  
 
The factors that we included in our collateral analysis were number of issues deal 
 size, number of loans, size of loans, concentration metrics, LTVs, DSCRs, the 
percentage of Interest Only loans (both partial and full), the super senior and super 
duper percentages, and the expected loss as implied by our updated collateral 
valuation work. 
2. Development of CMBS Market 
 
The American Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) insured 
the first mortgage pass-through security of an approved lender in 1968 (Fabozzi & 
Modigliani, 1992). In 1981, the first Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) was issued by 
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). A mortgage-backed 
security (MBS) is an asset-backed security that represents a claim on the cash flows 
from mortgage loans through a process known as securitization. Whereas a 
residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) is secured by a single-family or a 
two-to-four family parcel of real estate, a commercial mortgage-backed security 
(CMBS) is secured by commercial and multifamily properties, such as apartment 
buildings, retail or office properties, hotels, schools, industrial properties, or other 
commercial sites. CMBS pools are usually different from RMBS pools in several 
distinct ways. First, the number of loans that a CMBS pool contains is relatively small. 
Second, data on rental income history and on individual loan terms for the 
underlying property for securitization is readily available.  It is feasible for an 
informed investor to analyze each individual loan and to analyze the performance of 
the underlying properties in a CMBS pool. A similar analysis would be far more 
 difficult to conduct in a residential pool because of the difficulty in any prediction of 
rental income. Third, a CMBS usually has less prepayment risk than a residential MBS, 
due to the structure of commercial mortgages. Commercial mortgages often contain 
lockout provisions after which they can be subject to defeasance, yield maintenance, 
and prepayment penalties, all of which protect their bondholders. Finally, the pool 
composition and credit quality in CMBS pools has a great deal of heterogeneity, 
which is inherently absent in RMBS pools.  
 
 Securitization of commercial mortgages began in the early 1990s as a means for 
the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to dispose of assets of the failed Savings and 
Loan institutions. Securitization of these types of mortgages has grown significantly 
over the past 20 years (Graph 1). Based on data from the Federal Reserve, over one 
quarter of outstanding commercial mortgages are presently securitized. A large 
portion of this growth came about as insurance companies gradually changed the 
composition of their portfolios from whole commercial mortgage loans to a mix of 
commercial mortgages and CMBS. Commercial banks continue to dominate nearly 
half of all commercial mortgages and nearly all the commercial construction loans. 
 
CMBS is seen to be an attractive alternative for commercial real estate investors 
who are planning to increase their leverage wish to avoid funding by portfolio 
lenders. There is evidence that leverage buyouts of REITs was a huge part of the 
growth in CMBS in 2006 as well as in the first half of 2007. It is likely that the 
 availability of abundant and cheap debt through the CMBS markets, combined with 
the improving fundamentals associated with a growing economy, enabled leveraged 
investors to pay more for the purchases of commercial properties. These 
overpayments were not relegated to CMBS alone. Demand from the RMBS market 
fueled the increase in residential housing values and demand from investors in 
Leveraged Loans fueled public equity markets. 
 
3. Paper Description 
 
The work for this paper was completed in two parts. The first part was an analysis of 
origination trends (Graph 1-Graph 10). It showed higher LTVs, lower DSCR ratios, 
larger overall deal sizes, heavier concentrations, lower AAA credit support, and an 
increased presence of interest only loans. These factors describe an aggressive 
underwriting standard and were the main signals indicating that the deals had 
become riskier. 
 
The second part of our work (Graph 11) is the extrapolation of the collateral model 
we designed (described under the graph 11). In our model, CMBS bonds are 
expected to experience fewer losses as a result of an increasingly conservative 
underwriting standard as well as from improved property market.  
 
 
4. Research Methodology and Data description 
  
As before, the majority of the data we used in our model for CMBS underlying 
property and loan information came from Bloomberg. The 617 deals that we 
analyzed were exclusively from US deals and included data from a decade of 
approximately issued 4000 bonds. The deal types were among Conduit, single 
asset/single borrower (SASB), Portfolio, and Small balance.  
 
Graph 1. Total Issuance in billions by vintage, the compounded annual growth rate 
from 2000-2007 is 33.1%, and the overlay of the performance of the CPPI index, 
which is the basis for forecasting future losses  
 
(Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
US CMBS issuance hit a high in 2007 at a volume of USD  260 billions. This high 
represented a tenfold increase in volumes over the year 2000. The financial crisis 
resulted in a severe cooling of the securitization market: in 2008, CMBS issuance was 
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 down to approximately one-tenth (USD 17 billion) of the 2007 reading. It was not 
until 2009 that the market showed signs of even a slight recovery. In 2011, USD 20 
billion worth of CMBS have been issued in the US. We can see the Issuance increase 
align itself with the CPPI increase. 
 
 
Graph 2.  CMBS Deal Count by vintage. (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3a. Average Deal Loan Count by vintage. Underlying loan of the 2009 vintage 
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 deals is just a large single loan. (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
In 2007 deals, the average loan count per deal was 260. This average highlights the 
possible intention of increased diversification among the deals that were issued that 
year. The deals issued in 2010 and 2011 were typical of conduit and fusion deals and 
were much less diversified (smaller in number but with more loans within each deal), 
despite the fact that they had fewer average loan numbers per deal. The 2009 
vintage deals were entirely backed by multiple commercial properties and were 
collateralized using one single loan. 
 
 
 
Graph 3b. Average deal size by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg). 
 
Average deal size was 1.29 billions in 2010 (close to 2003 vintage) and 1.18 billion in 
2011. When the peaks of 2007 vintage were reached, the average deal size was 4,06 
billion. 
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Graph 3c. Average loan size by vintage. In 2009, all the deals were single loan deals, 
and the average loan size is 480 millions. (Sources: Bloomberg). 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Cutoff DSCR by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
From 2009 to 2011, the average cutoff for DSCRs fell from 1.89 to 1.65. The leverage 
and debt coverage ratios inched toward their pre-crisis levels. 
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Graph 5. Cutoff by Vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
The LTVs were later found to have peaked in 2007 as a result of the financial crisis. 
After a brief slide post 9/11, the stock market rallied, but again began to slide in 
March 2002. By July and September of 2002, the market reached lows, which had 
not been seen since 1997 or 1998. Well-publicized corporate fraud scandals such as 
Enron coupled with the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks to act as contributors to the 
loss of investor confidence in the stock market at that time. This loss of confidence 
also affected and spilled over into the real estate market. From 2009 to 2011 
issuance, the cut off LTV ratios increased by approximate 5 percent. 
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Graph 6. Partial IO and Full IO percentage by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
When a CMBS transaction matures, the loans securitizing it must refinance, 
according to how much of the loans have already been amortized. In accordance 
with the given structure (interest-only loans, partial interest-only loans, and 
amortizing loans), the act of loan refinancing gives rise to a more or less pronounced 
refinancing risk for the bank/lender as well as a more or less pronounced “maturity 
risk” for the bondholder. The share of interest-only or partial interest-only loans 
securitized in CMBS has strongly increased in the past. In 2007, it totaled 80% 
(2003,15%), in 2011 it decreased to a level of 30%.  
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Graph 7.  Original AAA credit support by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg). 
 
One of the most significant trends in the CMBS market over time has been the 
pronounced decline in subordination levels, which is the part of the pool that must 
default before the investors of a given tranche loses any of their principal.  
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Graph 8.  Deals with super senior or super duper by vintage. (Sources: Bloomberg). 
 
 
As evidenced by the declining levels of AAA subordination through 2004 (Graph 7), 
the Rating Agencies appear to have determined CMBS to be a less risky asset class 
over time.  This determination by the rating agencies, combined with the increase 
in deal volumes (graph 3b) shown in the previous graph, meant that larger absolute 
numbers of AAA bonds needed to be sold at relatively low spreads.  In order to 
meet the need to place this larger number of low yielding bonds, dealers created a 
structural twist in order to appeal to fixed income crossover investors that lacked the 
resources, means and expertise to underwrite commercial real estate which was 
becoming necessary at the natural AAA rate of subordination determined by the 
Rating Agencies.  By artificially increasing the AAA subordination rate through the 
creation of tiered AAA securities according credit priorities, a Super AAA class was 
created that could be deceptively but justifiably deemed to be an ultra safe credit 
product. Such a product would naturally be priced appealingly when compared to 
truly high quality corporate bonds.   The first iteration of this financial engineering 
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 exercise occurred in late 2004. Two AAA classes were introduced: a Super Senior 
class with 20% subordination and a lower priority junior AAA class (commonly 
referred to as an AJ tranche).  Many potential crossover investors felt that 
additional protection was necessary, and thus, 2005 saw the introduction of an 
additional layer of AAA credit.  With the stack now consisting of a Super Duper 
Senior with 30% subordination, a senior Mezzanine class with 20% subordination 
(commonly referred to as an AM tranche), and the lowest priority junior AAA (AJ) 
class. Throughout most of 2005, the market experimented with Super Senior and 
Super Duper classes until finally arriving at Super Duper as the consensus structure. 
From 2006 onwards to 2008, the market consisted exclusively of Super Dupers. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 9. Concentration by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
The concentration of deals, which is defined as the balance of top 10 loans within 
each deal divided by the total balance of the deal, averaged about 58% in the 
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 2010-2011 vintages. This concentration highlights increased diversification among 
recent conduit/fusion deals. Similarly to the deals issued from 2007-2008, when the 
average loan count within a deal ranged from 91-226, the typical conduit and fusion 
deals were much less diversified and ranging around from 60% to 66%. In 2009, the 
concentration was 100%. This can be explained due to the fact that the 2009 vintage 
deals were all backed by multiple commercial properties and collateralized with a 
single loan. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 10.  Property Type distribution by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
With a combined contribution of approximately 80%, the CMBS universe is 
dominated with collateral from the retail, multifamily (including manufactured 
housing), and office sectors. In the 2009 deals, the underlying property was a single 
retail property type. In the 2010 vintage, the hotel sector made up almost 70% of the 
CMBS universe. 
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Graph 11. Expected Loss by vintage (Sources: Bloomberg) 
 
 
 
We designed a collateral model to estimate the expected loss by vintage. In our 
model, we only modeled those deals defined by Bloomberg as Conduit, Portfolio, 
SASB, and Small Balance deals. In total, we modeled 617 US CMBS deals originating 
from data collected between 2000 and 2011. Over 60,000 underlying properties 
were included in the data fed to our model. The underlying property and loan 
information came exclusively from the Bloomberg database. We modeled the 
property value change by time-dependent Moody’s CPPI index. We also took the 
stressed property value into consideration. The discount factor for a particular 
stressed property was determined by how many stressed properties were relatively 
near the target property and how far away are they were from the target property. 
Moreover, we included the adjustment of delinquency loans and near-term maturing 
loans with high LTVs and lower DSCRs for property values. The refinanced loan factor 
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 was also included in the framework. We assumed a haircut of the property value at 
the origination if the loan was in the purpose of refinancing. 
We then subtracted the current balance of the underlying loan by the current 
estimated value of the property in our model to get the expected loss for each loan. 
Finally, we added all of the losses together and came up with the expected loss 
amount for each deal. Our results gave us the idea that we should investigate the 
change of value of the collateral under the loans in future research. 
 
The expected loss is defined as the loss-given default of the each property 
divided by the remaining balance of the deal. The default probability is assumed by 
the loan performance data as well as by the price appreciation of the underlying 
properties. The limitation of our calculated default probability is that, as the earlier 
vintages have already experienced substantial pay downs, any remaining expected 
loss is based on an artificially low denominator. Our modified calculation of expected 
loss is defined as the loss-given default of the each property divided by the cutoff 
balance of the deal. And the actual loss in the graph is the realized losses to date. So 
a reconciliation of actual and expected loss has been adjusted in the comparison of 
the total loss percentage between different vintages.. The total loss (actual and 
expected loss in total) in 2007 is about 37% of the cutoff balance. Due to the 
improved property market after the financial crisis, as opposed to the conservative 
underwriting as the sole input to expected losses implied by the framework, current 
market values have no additional predictive power. 
  
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
    As time progressed, CMBS deals became riskier as evidenced by more 
aggressive underwriting in the form of higher LTVs, lower DSCR ratios, larger 
overall deal sizes and heavier concentrations, lower AAA credit support, and by 
the increased presence of interest only loans. At the same time, property values 
increased at an elevated rate, perhaps at least partially attributed to the 
availability and attractive pricing of CMBS debt instruments. Additional significant 
demand from non-traditional CMBS investors was spurred by the introduction of 
Super and Super Duper AAA bonds and further fueled issuance in the years 
leading up the Global Financial Crisis. When the capital markets and 
securitization markets in particular abruptly shut down, property values were 
negatively impacted as the means to finance them all but disappeared. The 
resulting global economic slowdown caused erosion in property fundamentals, 
which further pressured capital values. As a result, CMBS bonds are currently 
expected to experience substantial losses going forward into the future and this is 
particularly so for the peak of the market vintages. The predicted losses as a 
result of the work performed at the direction of our mentors yields some 
interesting results as the super duper AAA classes from the peak vintages (on an 
 average basis at least) are likely to realize some form of loss. An interesting follow 
up would be an analysis of deal levels which would highlight deals that were 
better (worse) on average relative to other vintage cohort. We believe that 
investors would be well served by such an analysis.  
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